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Examining the Legal Foundations of Boumediene
v. Bush
by Dan Castellano*

I

I. Introduction

n Boumediene v. Bush1, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court
held 5-4 that enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, were entitled to the constitutional right of habeas corpus
and that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) combined
with the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) review process inadequately
substitutes for habeas corpus. As a result, Guantanamo detainees
may now petition the federal district court for a writ of review.
This monumental decision not only influenced the closing of the
Guantanamo facility, but demonstrated the Supreme Court’s willingness to go beyond the boundaries of law to define its role and
assert its power.2 The DTA system instituted by Congress constitutionally, and adequately substituted for habeas corpus; however, the
court provided inadequate reasons for striking down the DTA review
system. In addition, the decision neither improved the Guantanamo
detainees’ situation, nor did it speed up the process they must go
through to obtain judicial review. By examining the arguments made
by both sides and reviewing the Supreme Court’s majority opinion,
*
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Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).

2

Megan Gaffney, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197, 197 (2009).
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I will show that the DTA had provided a review system that was a
constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed The
Authorization for Use of Military Force,3 which approved the use
of U.S. Armed Forces against “those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” This law justified President Bush’s detention of suspected terrorists and ordered military
tribunals to conduct governmental prosecutions of the detainees.4
Furthermore, president Bush cited Johnson v. Eisentrager5 as precedent to establish the prison at Guantanamo Bay.6 In Johnson, the
Court decided that the U.S. judicial system did have jurisdiction over
German criminals of war detained in U.S. prisons in Germany. As of
October 2009, 221 detainees remain in Guantanamo Bay.7
In 2002 however, several detainees began disputing the legality of their detentions including Rasul v. Bush,8 which was the first
case to go to the Supreme Court for review. Rasul claimed that he
was entitled to habeas corpus review and challenged his status as an
enemy combatant.9 Although the district court previously dismissed
Rasul’s claims on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the district court’s decision and
granted judicial review.10

3

Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).

4

Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1665-68
(Nov. 13, 2001).

5

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, (1950).

6

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008).

7

The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study,
Governance Studies at Brookings (2008),www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees_wittes.pdf.

8

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004).

9

Id.

10

Id. at 473-475.
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In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 11 decided shortly after Rasul v. Bush, the
Court reviewed the denial of habeas corpus to Hamdi, an American
citizen held at Guantanamo. Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan
like Rasul; however, unlike Rasul, Hamdi was an American citizen.12
The majority held that “the Constitution guaranteed an American
citizen challenging his detention as an enemy combatant the right
to notice of the factual basis for his classification.”13 The majority
also stated that a “constitutionally adequate collateral process could
be provided by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal.”14 The process that was struck down as inadequate
in Boumediene provided a tribunal that met these conditions, as will
be shown hereafter.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul and
Hamdi, Congress established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT). The CSRT permitted detainees to “contest their designation
as an enemy combatant.” This law allowed detainees to participate
in the proceedings by calling witnesses and presenting evidence.15
CSRT proceedings have resulted in the release of a few detainees,
but the majority of proceedings affirmed the detainees’ status as enemy combatants.16
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) to
prevent federal courts from having jurisdiction over petitions from
detainees at Guantanamo.17 The DTA provided that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien

11

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).

12

Id.

13

Id. at 533.

14

Id. at 533, 538.

15

See Combatant Status Review Tribunal Process, sec. B, at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.

16

Robert M. Chesney, Boumediene v. Bush, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 848 (2008).

17

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
(2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §2241(e) (2005) (amended 2006)).
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detained at Guantanamo Bay.”18 Guantanamo detainees were thus
prohibited from invoking habeas corpus.
Finally, congress later passed the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA),19 which “authorize[d] trial by military commission for
violations of the law of war” and prevented the federal courts from
hearing habeas corpus petitions from detainees.20

II. Case and Decision
In Boumediene, the petitioners sought review in district court for
two reasons: first, their lengthy detention without cause, and second,
their designation as enemy combatants by military tribunals. The
district court held that the MCA prevented all federal courts from
hearing petitions by stripping them of jurisdiction.21 Soon afterwards
the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.22
The Court of Appeals also held that the removal of jurisdiction by
the MCA was legal because the petitioners were foreign nationals
being held outside the United States.23
On June 29, 2007, after an initial refusal to review the case, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Detainees argued that the right
to the writ of habeas corpus extends to detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. In addition, the petitioners argued that by enacting the MCA
Congress had violated the Suspension Clause, which prohibits the
suspension of habeas corpus except under certain conditions.24 However, because detainees outside the de jure territory of the United
States do not possess constitutional rights, including habeas corpus,
the actions of Congress did not violate the Suspension Clause.
18

Id.

19

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).

20

Id.

21

Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

22

Id. at 987-89.

23

Id. at 988-94.

24

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
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In their decision, the Court analyzed the history of the writ of
habeas corpus and noted that the Suspension Clause permits suspension only when public safety requires it.25 The writ of habeas corpus
protects individuals from unlawful imprisonment; the Court characterized it as a “vital instrument” and an “essential mechanism in the
separation-of-powers scheme.”26 The Court then turned to the issue
of whether the United States has legal sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. After acknowledging that Cuba, and not the United States,
retains de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, the Court held
that the U.S. maintains de facto sovereignty over the territory.27 The
Court held that the detainees have a right to review, and any abridgement of that right must follow the Suspension Clause.28
The petitioners also argued that the CSRT procedures under the
DTA inadequately replaced the writ.29 The government contended
that the DTA created a more efficient procedure that adequately substituted for habeas corpus review.30 After examining the CSRT procedures in detail, the Court agreed with petitioners that the tribunal
had the potential risk of detaining prisoners for unreasonably long
periods.31 As a result, the Court held that the DTA review process
was an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus review.

III. Legal Merits of Decision
In their opinion, the majority acknowledged that “practical
considerations principally influenced” its decision.32 One of those
practical considerations was that a few of the petitioners had been
detained for six years already and would likely be detained further if
25

Id.

26

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).

27

See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).

28

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.		

29

Br. for Petitioners, supra note 69, at 18-19.

30

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.

31

Id. at 2256.

32

Id. at 2275.
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the Court required them to complete the DTA review; the “costs of
delay” were too high.33 In truth, the DTA procedures were adequate
substitutes for habeas review because they met all the established
requirements for a constitutionally adequate substitute. The majority
made legally weak objections to the DTA, which I will examine for
their legal merit.34
The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision held that the DTA was inadequate, but failed to specify which rights of detainees were not
protected under the DTA. In addition, the DTA processes required
less time than the new procedures. In describing these new processes, Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia pointed out in their dissenting
opinion: “Before bringing their habeas petitions, detainees must …
complete the CSRT process. Then, they may seek review in federal
district court. Either success or failure there will surely result in an
appeal to the D.C. Circuit—exactly where judicial review starts under Congress’s system.”35 In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision
added additional steps in the judicial review process for detainees,
with the original system requiring less time than the new procedures.
The DTA review process also adequately protected the detainees’
constitutional right of habeas corpus, which exists for the purpose of
testing the legality of executive detention.36 The DTA effectively protected this important right by providing an Article III court that possessed the power to hear claims and order the release of detainees.
The majority admitted that the DTA provided an Article III court
with the power to order release, but disputed the process.37 However,
in Hamdi, the majority held that “an appropriately authorized and
properly constituted military tribunal” provided a constitutionally
adequate process.38 This is exactly what the DTA provided and therefore, adequately safeguarded detainees’ habeas corpus rights.
33

Id.

34

Id. at 2274.

35

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2272 (2008).

36

Id. at 2273.

37

Id.

38

Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
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Furthermore, the majority mistakenly concluded that DTA review was the only opportunity available to Guantanamo detainees to
challenge their enemy combatant status; the majority also wrongly
characterized the CSRT process as a quick review of the Executive’s
battlefield determination.39 In reality, the Executive’s determination
of a detainee’s status is only made after a lengthy process involving “multiple levels of review by military officers and officials of
the Department of Defense.”40 In addition, the CSRT functions in
essentially the same manner as a court would: it gathers evidence,
calls witnesses, hears testimonies, and makes decisions based on the
legality of the detention.41 In addition, the CSRT has the power to order a detainee released if it finds he or she has been illegally held—a
requirement for a satisfactory substitute of habeas corpus.42
There is more to the DTA system than just CSRT review. As
Justice Roberts pointed out in his dissent, “CSRT review is just the
first tier of collateral review in the DTA system.”43 The statute of the
DTA gives the D.C. Circuit the power to consider whether the determination of a detainee’s status is “consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.”44 A separate court then determines
whether the CSRT procedures are constitutional and whether the procedures are followed correctly. According to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, this
review process adequately satisfies any due process requirement.45
The majority in Boumediene v. Bush continued to justify its
dismissal of the DTA system by alleging supposed limitations of
39

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2284 (2008).

40

Memorandum of the Secretary of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant
Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (July 29, 2004), App. J to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 06-1196, p 150

41

See Implementation Memo, App. J to Pet. for Cert. in No. 06-1196, at
153-162.

42

Id. at 164.

43

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2285 (2008).

44

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
(2005)

45

Hamdi, 542 U. S. 507, 510 (2004).

50
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the system. In truth, closer examination of the DTA system shows
that the majority’s argument lacks factual support. They argued that
evidentiary limitations and the lack of legal counsel for detainees
made the DTA unsatisfactory.46 They further argued that permissible evidence is limited to that which is “reasonably available.”47
The majority added that the DTA system was inadequate due to the
inherent difficulties in obtaining evidence for enemy combatants
detained abroad. Yet in reality, evidence will be difficult to obtain
regardless of whether it is done under habeas corpus review or the
DTA because often the evidence must be obtained from distant or
war-torn countries. Therefore, it makes sense that evidence would
be limited to that which is “reasonably available.” In addition, the
DTA system permits detainees to present evidence, call witnesses,
question witnesses, and testify in court. The court’s conclusion that
the DTA system is insufficient lacks supports as it creates supposed
“limitations” that do not actually exist.
The majority then argued that the DTA system is inadequate
because it does not allow detainees access to classified material.48
The court reasoned that there is the possibility of exculpatory evidence being found within classified documents. In truth, exculpatory evidence inside classified material was wholly available at the
CSRT stage. Each detainee is granted a personal representative who
can review classified material and search for any such evidence. The
detainee’s personal representative may assist in arranging witnesses,
gathering evidence, and other procedures. 49 The court failed to appreciate the fact that CSRT procedures granted detainees adequate
access to classified material through their personal representative.
When examined more closely, it becomes clear that the judicial
review privileges under the CSRT process are actually greater than
those afforded to prisoners of war. Under the Geneva Convention,
46

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2290 (2008).

47

See Implementation Memo, App. J to Pet. for Cert. in No. 06-1196, at 155.

48

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2290 (2008).

49

Implementation Memo, supra, at 152, 154-155, 156; Brief for Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) at 54-55.
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prisoners of war are not granted access to classified material.50 Since
it should not be expected that enemy combatants be granted greater
access to classified material than prisoners of war in full compliance
with the Geneva Convention, how can the majority criticize Guantanamo detainee’s lack of access to such material?51 Furthermore,
detainees at Guantanamo Bay have been determined to be unlawful
enemy combatants, and as such should not be entitled to the same
rights as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. Detainees
at Guantanamo Bay are afforded equal or greater access to classified
material than prisoners of war and for this reason the DTA system
cannot be struck down as inadequate.52
It is important to remember that all of this occurs at the CSRT
stage. Detainees receive an additional review process before the D.C.
Circuit. At this stage detainees are granted full access to appellate
counsel and may challenge the legal and factual basis of their detentions.53 The majority is well aware that access to classified material
has never been granted to alien enemy combatants. Therefore, the
court’s difficulty with the lack of access to classified material is insufficient and irrelevant.
An argument of the majority was that detainees may not introduce newly discovered exculpatory evidence after their CSRT proceedings have finished.54 The CSRT procedures grant detainees the
ability to introduce exculpatory evidence before military tribunals
if this ability is denied contrary to the Constitution or the laws of
the United States; the D.C. Circuit has the authority to correct the
problem. The Court seems to fear a situation in which the CSRT
process confirms a detainee’s status as an enemy combatant based
upon evidence that is later shown to be false. The Court wrongfully
supposes that an enemy combatant would have no means of redress.
50

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

51

William Haynes, Enemy Combatants, Council on Foreign Relations
(2002), http://www.cfr.org/publication/5312/enemy_combatants.html.

52

Id.

53

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2289 (2008).

54

Id. at 2290.

52
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This hypothetical situation that the Court fears has yet to come to
pass. Even if this situation were to occur, both the petitioners and the
Solicitor General agree that the DTA system allows the D.C. Circuit
to remand the case back to the CSRT stage.55
There exists another possible solution to the Court’s hypothetical situation: when new evidence is discovered, the Secretary of Defense can “direct that a CSRT convene to reconsider the basis of the
detainee’s. . . status in light of the new information.”56 In fact, the
DTA statute specifically directs the Secretary of Defense to “provide
for periodic review of any new evidence that may become available
relating to the enemy combatant status of a detainee.”57 As Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, “if this is the most the Court can muster, the
ice beneath its feet is thin indeed.”58

IV. Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush to grant habeas corpus privileges to enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay
rests on a weak legal foundation. The Court failed to understand and
evaluate the DTA system as a legal and adequate substitute for habeas corpus review. Closer examination shows that the Court’s decision
was not based on solid legal precedent but must have been influenced
by non-legal considerations. Therefore, it is imperative that judges
rely more on legal precedent in making their decisions. The DTA
system provided an Article III court with the power to order release
and allowed detainees to present evidence, question witnesses, and
testify with the assistance of a personal representative at the CSRT
review stage. It also contained adequate protections for detainees
55

Brief for Petitioner, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No.
06-1195); Brief for Federal Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195) at 60-61.

56

Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants, Instruction 5421.1, Procedure for Review of “New Evidence” Relating to Enemy Combatant (EC) Status PP 4(a)(1), 5(b) (May 7, 2007).

57

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, ß 1005(a)(3).

58

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2289 (2008).
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who might be wrongfully determined to be enemy combatants at
the CSRT stage. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision to strike down
the DTA as inadequate will force detainees to follow a new process:
detainees will now be required to complete the CSRT process before
bringing their claim to the federal district court and eventually to
the D.C. Circuit. This new process guarantees additional delay by
increasing redundancy to an already difficult process.

